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Abstract
The concept of an agent has recently become important in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI), and its
relativelyyouthfulsubﬁeld, DistributedAI(DAI). Ouraim inthispaper istopointthe reader at what
we perceive to be the most important theoretical and practical issues associated with the design and
construction of intelligent agents. For convenience, we divide the area into three themes (though
as the reader will see, these divisions are at times somewhat arbitrary). Agent theory is concerned
with the question of what an agent is, and the use of mathematical formalisms for representing
and reasoning about the properties of agents. Agent architectures can be thought of as software
engineering models of agents; researchers in this area are primarily concerned with the problem
of constructing software or hardware systems that will satisfy the properties speciﬁed by agent
theorists. Finally, agent languages are software systems for programming and experimenting with
agents;these languagestypicallyembodyprinciplesproposedbytheorists. Thepaper isnotintended
to serve as a tutorialintroductionto all the issues mentioned; we hope instead simply to identify the
key issues, and pointto workthatelaborates onthem. The paper closes witha detailedbibliography,
and some bibliographical remarks.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One way of deﬁning AI is by saying that it is the subﬁeld of computer science which aims to construct
agents that exhibit aspects of intelligent behaviour. One view, which would nowadays be regarded as
extreme by many AI researchers, is that these agents will recreate intelligent human behaviour in all
respects; a perhaps more widely held view is that even if human intelligence is out of the question, (at
least for the time being), it would nevertheless be useful to be able to build agents that can exhibit some
aspects of intelligent human behaviour. The notion of an agent is thus central to AI. It is perhaps sur-
prising, therefore, that until the mid to late 1980s, researchers from mainstream AI gave relatively little
consideration to the issues surrounding agent synthesis. Since then, however, there has been a marked
ﬂowering of interest in the subject, and the concept of an ‘agent’ has been adopted by a variety of sub-
disciplinesof AI and mainstream computer science. One now hears of ‘agents’in software engineering,
data communications and concurrent systems research, as well as robotics, AI, and distributed AI. A
recent article in a British national daily paper made the following prediction:
‘Agent-basedcomputing(ABC) islikelytobe thenextsigniﬁcantbreakthroughinsoftware
development’1.
1‘Back to schoolfor a brand new ABC’. The Guardian,March 12th, 1992, page 28. See [55] for a (somewhat inaccurate)
overview of ‘agent based computing’ from the popular science press.
1A whole programming paradigm has even been christened ‘agent-oriented programming’ [121]. Our
aim in this paper is to survey what we perceive to be the most important issues in the design and
construction of agents, from the standpoint of (D)AI. For convenience, we identify three key issues,
and structure our survey around these (cf. [117, p1]):
Agent theories: What exactly are agents? What properties should they have, and how are we to form-
ally represent and reason about these properties?
Agent architectures: How are we to construct agents that satisfy the properties we expect of them?
What software and/or hardware structures are appropriate?
Agent languages: How are we to program agents? What are the right primitives for this task? How
are we to effectively compile or execute agent programs?
We begin, in the following section, with the issue of agent theories, and a consideration of the question
of how to deﬁne agency; in section 3, we discuss architectures, and in section 4, we discuss languages
for programming agents. Some concluding remarks appear in section 5.
2 Agent Theories
As we observed above, there are many different usages of the term agent in AI and computer science,
and each yet each of these usages appeals to a subtly different notion of agency. An obvious point of
departure for our study is therefore a consideration of the question: what is an agent?
A dictionary deﬁnes an agent as: ‘one who, or that which, exerts power or produces an effect’2.
While this deﬁnition is not terribly helpful, it does at least indicate that action is somehow involved,
and indeed it does seem at ﬁrst sight that the notion of action is inextricably bound to that of agency:
‘Agents do things, they act: that is why they are called agents’. [118]
A tacit assumption is that agents take an active role, originating actions that affect their environment,
rather than passively allowing their environment to affect them. Two terms often used to describe
agentiveaction are autonomyand rationality. Autonomygenerallymeans thatanagentoperateswithout
direct human (or other) intervention or guidance. Rationality is not so easily tied down, but is often
used in the pseudo-game-theoretic sense of an agent maximizing its performance with respect to some
‘valuation function’ (see [48, pp49–54] for a discussion of rationality and agency).
Unfortunately,autonomousrationalaction, sodeﬁned, isa weakcriterionfor agenthood,as itadmits
a very wide class of objects as agents. For example, it is perfectly consistent to describe a transistor —
essentiallythe simplest form of electronic switch — as an autonomous rational agent by this deﬁnition.
Perhaps more troubling for an action-based analysis of agency is that the very notion of action is
a slippery one. For example, almost any action can be described in a number of different ways, each
seemingly valid. A classic example, due to the philosopher Searle, is that of Gavrilo Princip in 1914:
did he pull a trigger, ﬁre a gun, kill Archduke Ferdinand, or start World War I? Each of these seem to
be equally valid descriptions of the same action or event. Trying to describe actions in terms of causal
links does not help, as it introduces a seemingly inﬁnite regress. For example, in waving to a friend,
I lift my arm, which was caused by muscles contracting, which was caused by some neurons ﬁring,
which was caused by… and so on. There is no easy way of halting this regress without appealing to a
notion of primitive action, which is philosophicallysuspect3.
2The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (7th edn), Oxford University Press, 1988
3See [4] for a classic AI attempt to deal with the notion of action, and [118] for an analysis of the relationship between
action and agency.An action-based analysis of agency does not look like it is going to work. What other properties
of agency might one consider? Shoham has suggested that the term ‘agent’ in AI is often used to
denote ‘high-level’ systems, that employ symbolic representations, and perhaps enjoy some ‘cognitive-
like’ function, (such as explicit logical reasoning) [121]. This ‘high-level’ condition excludes systems
such as transistorsand thermostats, the neuron-like entities of connectionism, and the objects of object-
oriented programming. It implies that agents possess signiﬁcant computationalresources (though these
resources will, of course, be ﬁnite). However, the ‘high-level’ property is a contentious one: a number
of researchers vigorously argue that ‘high-level’ agents are not the best way to go about AI. The chief
protagonist in this debate is Brooks, who has built a number of robotic agents which are certainly not
‘high-level’byShoham’sdeﬁnition,andyetareabletoperformtasksthatareimpressivebyAIstandards
(see the discussion in section 4). So a ‘high-level’ condition does not seem to be useful for classifying
agents, as it discriminates against systems that do not employ explicit cognitive-like functions.
Perhaps the most widely held view is that an agent is an entity ‘which appears to be the subject
of beliefs, desires, etc.’ [117, p1]. The philosopher Dennett has coined the term intentional system to
denote such systems.
2.1 Agents as Intentional Systems
When explaining human activity, it is often useful to make statements such as the following:
Janine took her umbrella because she believed it was going to rain.
Michael worked hard because he wanted to possess a PhD.
These statements makes use of a folkpsychology, by whichhuman behaviouris predictedand explained
through the attribution of attitudes, such as believing and wanting (as in the above examples), hoping,
fearing, and so on. This folk psychologyis well established: most people reading the above statements
would say they found their meaning entirely clear, and would not give them a second glance.
The attitudes employed in such folk psychological descriptions are called the intentional notions.
The philosopher Daniel Dennett has coined the term intentional system to describe entities ‘whose
behaviour can be predicted by the method of attributing belief, desires and rational acumen’ [35, p49].
Dennett identiﬁes different ‘grades’ of intentional system:
‘A ﬁrst-order intentional system has beliefs and desires (etc.) but no beliefs and desires
about beliefs and desires. […] A second-order intentionalsystem is more sophisticated;it
has beliefs and desires (and no doubtother intentionalstates) about beliefsand desires (and
other intentionalstates) — both those of others and its own’. [35, p243]
One can carry on this hierarchy of intentionalityas far as required.
An obvious question is whether it is legitimate or useful to attribute beliefs, desires, and so on, to
artiﬁcial agents. Isn’t this just anthropomorphism? McCarthy, among others, has argued that there are
occasions when the intentional stance is appropriate:
‘To ascribe beliefs, free will, intentions, consciousness, abilities,o rwants to a machine
is legitimate when such an ascription expresses the same information about the machine
that it expresses about a person. It is useful when the ascription helps us understand the
structure of the machine, its past or future behaviour, or how to repair or improve it. It is
perhaps never logically required even for humans, but expressing reasonably brieﬂyw h a t
isactuallyknownaboutthe stateof themachine ina particularsituationmay require mental
qualitiesor qualitiesisomorphictothem. Theoriesof belief, knowledgeandwantingcanbe
constructedfor machines in a simpler settingthan for humans, and later appliedto humans.
Ascriptionofmentalqualitiesismost straightforwardformachinesofknownstructuresuch
as thermostats and computer operating systems, but is most useful when applied to entities
whose structure is incompletely known’. [93], (quoted in [121])What objects can be described by the intentional stance? As it turns out, more or less anything can.
In his doctoral thesis, Seel showed that even very simple, automata-like objects can be consistently
ascribed intentional descriptions [117]; similar work by Rosenschein and Kaelbling, (albeit with a dif-
ferent motivation), arrived at a similar conclusion [111]. For example, consider a light switch:
‘It is perfectly coherent to treat a light switch as a (very cooperative) agent with the cap-
ability of transmitting current at will, who invariably transmits current when it believes
that we want it transmitted and not otherwise; ﬂicking the switch is simply our way of
communicating our desires’. [121, p6]
And yet most adults would ﬁnd such a description absurd — perhaps even infantile. Why is this? The
answer seems tobe that whiletheintentionalstancedescriptionis perfectlyconsistentwiththe observed
behaviour of a light switch, and is internally consistent,
‘… it does not buy us anything,since we essentiallyunderstandthe mechanism sufﬁciently
to have a simpler, mechanistic description of its behaviour’. [121, p6]
Put crudely, the more we know about a system, the less we need to rely on animistic, intentional ex-
planations of its behaviour. However, with very complex systems, even if a complete, accurate picture
of the system’s architecture and working is available, a mechanistic, design stance explanation of its
behaviour may not be practicable. Consider a computer. Althoughwe might have a complete technical
description of a computer available, it is hardly practicable to appeal to such a description when ex-
plaining why a menu appears when we click a mouse on an icon. In such situations, it may be more
appropriate to adopt an intentional stance description, if that description is consistent, and simpler than
the alternatives. The intentionalnotions are thus abstractiontools, which provide us with a convenient
and familiar way of describing, explaining, and predicting the behaviour of complex systems.
Being an intentional system seems to be a necessary condition for agenthood, but is it a sufﬁcient
condition? Inhisrecent Master’s thesis,Shardlowtrawledthroughtheliteratureofcognitivescienceand
itscomponentdisciplinesinan attempttoﬁnd a unifyingconceptthatunderliesthe notionofagenthood.
He was forced to the following conclusion:
‘Perhaps there is something more to an agent than its capacity for beliefs and desires, but
whatever that thing is, it admits no uniﬁed account within cognitive science’. [118]
So, anagentisasystemthatismostconvenientlydescribedbytheintentionalstance;onewhosesimplest
consistentdescription requires the intentionalstance. Before proceeding, it is worth considering exactly
which attitudes are appropriate for representing agents. For the purposes of this survey, the two most
important categories are informationattitudes and pro-attitudes:
information attitudes
￿
belief
knowledge
pro-attitudes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
desire
intention
obligation
commitment
choice
…
Thus information attitudes are related to the information that an agent has about the world it occupies,
whereas pro-attitudesare thosethatinsome wayguidetheagent’s actions. Preciselywhichcombination
of attitudes is most appropriate to characterise an agent is, as we shall see later, an issue of some
debate. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that an agent must be represented in terms of at leastone information attitude, and at least one pro-attitude. Note that pro- and information attitudes are
closely linked, as a rational agent will make make choices and form intentions, etc., on the basis of the
information it has about the world. Much work in agent theory is concerned with sorting out exactly
what the relationship between the different attitudes is.
The next step is to investigate methods for representing and reasoning about these intentional no-
tions.
2.2 Representing Intentional Notions
Suppose one wishes to reason about intentionalnotionsin a logical framework. Consider the following
statement (after [50, pp210–211]):
Janine believes Cronos is the father of Zeus. (1)
A naive attempt to translate (1) into ﬁrst-order logic might result in the following:
Bel(Janine,Father(Zeus,Cronos)) (2)
Unfortunately, this naive translation does not work, for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is syntactic: the
secondargument totheBel predicate isa formulaofﬁrst-order logic,andisnot, therefore, a term. So (2)
is not a well-formed formula of classical ﬁrst-order logic. The second problem is semantic, and is more
serious. The constants Zeus and Jupiter, by any reasonable interpretation, denote the same individual:
the supreme deity of the classical world. It is therefore acceptable to write, in ﬁrst-order logic:
(Zeus = Jupiter). (3)
Given (2) and (3), the standard rules of ﬁrst-order logic would allow the derivation of the following:
Bel(Janine,Father(Jupiter,Cronos)) (4)
But intuitionrejects thisderivationas invalid: believingthatthe father of Zeus isCronos isnot the same
as believing that the father of Jupiter is Cronos. So what is the problem? Why does ﬁrst-order logic
fail here? The problem is that the intentional notions — such as belief and desire — are referentially
opaque, in that they set up opaque contexts, in which the standard substitutionrules of ﬁrst-order logic
do not apply. In classical (propositional or ﬁrst-order) logic, the denotation, or semantic value, of an
expression is dependent solely on the denotations of its sub-expressions. For example, the denotation
of the propositional logic formula p ∧ q is a function of the truth-values of p and q. The operators of
classical logic are thus said to be truth functional. In contrast, intentionalnotions such as belief are not
truth functional. It is surely not the case that the truth value of the sentence:
Janine believes p (5)
is dependent solely on the truth-value of p4. So substituting equivalents into opaque contexts is not
going to preserve meaning. This is what is meant by referential opacity. The existence of referentially
opaque contexts has been known since the time of Frege. He suggested a distinction between sense
and reference. In ordinary formulae, the ‘reference’ of a term/formula (i.e., its denotation) is needed,
whereas in opaque contexts, the ‘sense’ of a formula is needed (see also [117, p3]).
Clearly, classical logics are not suitable in their standard form for reasoning about intentional no-
tions: alternative formalisms are required.
The ﬁeld of formal methods for reasoning about intentional notions is widely reckoned to have
begun with the publication, in 1962, of Hintikka’s book Knowledge and Belief [71]. At that time, the
4Note, however, that the sentence (5) is itself a proposition, in that its denotation is the value true or false.subjectwasofinteresttocomparativelyfewresearchers inlogicandthephilosophyof mind. Sincethen,
however, it has become an important research area in its own right, with contributionsfrom researchers
in AI, formal philosophy,linguisticsand economics. Despite the diversity of interests and applications,
the number of basic techniques in use is quite small. Recall, from the discussion above, that there are
two problemsto be addressedin developinga logicalformalism for intentionalnotions: a syntacticone,
and a semantic one. It follows that any formalism can be characterized in terms of two independent
attributes: its language of formulation,a n dsemantic model [80, p83].
Therearetwofundamentalapproachestothesyntacticproblem. Theﬁrst is tousea modallanguage,
which contains non-truth-functional modal operators, which are applied to formulae. An alternative
approach involvesthe use of a meta-language: a many-sortedﬁrst-order language containingterms that
denote formulae of some other object-language. Intentional notions can be represented using a meta-
languagepredicate, andgivenwhateveraxiomatizationisdeemed appropriate. Bothoftheseapproaches
have their advantages and disadvantages, and will be discussed in the sequel.
As with the syntactic problem, there are two basic approaches to the semantic problem. The ﬁrst,
best known, and probably most widely used approach is to adopt a possible worlds semantics, where
an agent’s beliefs, knowledge, goals, etc. are characterized as a set of so-called possible worlds, with
an accessibility relation holding between them. Possible worlds semantics have an associated corres-
pondence theory which makes them an attractive mathematical tool to work with [26]. However, they
also have many associated difﬁculties, notablythe well-knownlogical omniscienceproblem, which im-
plies that agents are perfect reasoners. A number of variations on the possible-worldstheme have been
proposed, in an attempt to retain the correspondence theory, but withoutlogicalomniscience. The com-
monest alternative to the possibleworlds model for belief is to use a sentential,o rinterpreted symbolic
structures approach. In this scheme, beliefs are viewed as symbolic formulae explicitly represented in
a data structure associated with an agent. An agent then believes ϕ if ϕ is present in its belief data
structure. Despite its simplicity, the sentential model works well under certain circumstances [80].
In the subsectionsthat follow, we discussvarious approaches in some more detail. We begin with a
close look at the basic possible worlds model for logics of knowledge (epistemic logics) and logics of
belief (doxastic logics).
Possible Worlds Semantics
Thepossibleworldsmodelfor logicsof knowledgeand beliefwas originallyproposedbyHintikka[71],
and is now most commonly formulated in a normal modal logic using the techniques developed by
Kripke [84]5. Hintikka’s insight was to see that an agent’s beliefs could be characterized in terms of a
set of possible worlds, in the following way. Consider an agent playing a card game such as poker6.
In this game, the more one knows about the cards possessed by one’s opponents, the better one is able
to play. And yet complete knowledge of an opponent’s cards is generally impossible, (if one excludes
cheating). Theabilitytoplaypokerwellthusdepends, atleastinpart, ontheabilitytodeducewhatcards
are held by an opponent, given the limited informationavailable. Now suppose our agent possessedthe
ace of spades. Assuming the agent’s sensory equipment was functioningnormally, it would be rational
of her to believe that she possessed this card. Now suppose she were to try to deduce what cards were
heldbyheropponents. Thiscouldbedonebyﬁrstcalculatingallthevariousdifferentways thatthecards
in the pack could possiblyhave been distributedamong the variousplayers. (Thisis not beingproposed
as an actual card playing strategy, but for illustration!) For argument’s sake, suppose that each possible
conﬁguration is described on a separate piece of paper. Once the process was complete, our agent can
then begin to systematically eliminate from this large pile of paper all those conﬁgurations which are
not possible, given what she knows. For example, any conﬁguration in which she did not possess the
5In Hintikka’s original work, heuseda techniquebasedon‘model sets’,which is equivalentto Kripke’s formalism, though
less elegant. See [72, pp351–352]for a comparison and discussion of the two techniques.
6This example was adapted from [64].ace of spades could be rejected immediately as impossible. Call each piece of paper remaining after this
process a world. Each world represents one state of affairs considered possible, given what she knows.
Hintikka coined the term epistemic alternatives to describe the worlds possible given one’s beliefs.
Something true in all our agent’s epistemic alternatives could be said to be believed by the agent. For
example, it will be true in all our agent’s epistemic alternatives that she has the ace of spades.
On a ﬁrst reading, this seems a peculiarly roundabout way of characterizing belief, but it has two
advantages. First, it remains neutral on the subject of the cognitive structure of agents. It certainly
doesn’t posit any internalized collection of possible worlds. It is just a convenient way of character-
izing belief. Second, the mathematical theory associated with the formalization of possible worlds is
extremely appealing (see below).
The next step is to show how possible worlds may be incorporated into the semantic framework of
a logic. Epistemic logics are usually formulated as normal modal logics using the semantics developed
by Kripke [84]. Before moving on to explicitly epistemic logics, we consider a simple normal modal
logic. This logic is essentially classical propositionallogic, extended by the addition of two operators:
‘ ’ (necessarily), and ‘
￿’ (possibly). Let Prop =
fp,q,…
g be a countable set of atomic propositions.
Then the syntax of the logic is deﬁned by the following rules: (i) if p ∈ Prop then p is a formula; (ii) if
ϕ,ψ are formulae, then so are ¬ϕ and ϕ ∨ ψ; and (iii) if ϕ is a formula then so are ϕ and
￿ϕ.
The operators ‘¬’ (not) and ‘∨’ (or) have their standard meanings. The remaining connectives of
classical propositionallogic can be deﬁned as abbreviations in the usual way. The formula ϕ is read:
‘necessarily ϕ’, and the formula
￿ϕ is read: ‘possibly ϕ’. Now to the semantics of the language.
Normal modal logics are concerned with truth at worlds; models for such logics therefore contain a
set of worlds, W, and a binary relation, R,o nW, saying which worlds are considered possible relative
to other worlds. Additionally, a valuation function π is required, saying what propositions are true at
each world. Formally, a model is a triple
hW, R, π
i,w h e r eW is a non-empty set of worlds, R ⊆ W ×W,
and π : W → powerset Prop is a valuation function, which says for each world w ∈ W which atomic
propositions are true in w. An alternative, equivalent technique would have been to deﬁne π as π :
W × Prop →
fT, F
g.
The semanticsof the languageare givenvia the satisfactionrelation, ‘|=’, which holdsbetween pairs
of the form
hM,w
i,( w h e r eM is a model, and w is a reference world), and formulae of the language.
The semantic rules deﬁning this relation are given below.
hM,w
i |= p where p ∈ Prop, iff p ∈ π(w)
hM,w
i |= ¬ϕ iff
hM,w
i ⁄ |= ϕ
hM,w
i |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff
hM,w
i |= ϕ or
hM,w
i |= ψ
hM,w
i |= ϕ iff ∀w′∈W, if (w, w′) ∈ R then
hM,w′
i |= ϕ
hM,w
i |=
￿ϕ iff ∃w′∈W, (w, w′) ∈ R and
hM,w′
i |= ϕ
The deﬁnition of satisfaction for atomic propositionsthus captures the idea of truth in the ‘current’
world, (which appears on the left of ‘|=’). The semantic rules for ‘¬’a n d‘ ∨’ are standard. The rule for
‘ ’ captures the idea of truth in all accessible worlds, and the rule for ‘
￿’ captures the idea of truth in
at least one possibleworld. Note that the two modal operators are duals of each other, in the sense that
the universal and existential quantiﬁers of ﬁrst-order logic are duals:
ϕ ⇔¬
￿¬ϕ
￿ϕ ⇔¬ ¬ϕ.
It would thus have been possible to take either one as primitive, and introduce the other as a derived
operator.
Correspondence Theory
To understand the extraordinary properties of this simple logic, it is ﬁrst necessary to introduce validity
and satisﬁability. A formula is satisﬁable if it is satisﬁed for some model/world pair, and unsatisﬁableotherwise. A formula is true in a model if it is satisﬁed for every world in the model, and valid in a
class of models if it true in every model in the class. Finally, a formula is valid simpliciter if it is true
in the class of all models. If ϕ is valid, we write |= ϕ.
The two basic properties of this logic are as follows. First, the following axiom schema is valid.
|= (ϕ ⇒ ψ)⇒( ϕ ⇒ ψ)
This axiom is called K, in honour of Kripke. The second property is as follows.
If |= ϕ then |= ϕ
Proofsofthesepropertiesareleft asanexercise forthereader. Now, sinceKisvalid,itwillbea theorem
of any complete axiomatization of normal modal logic. Similarly, the second property will appear as a
rule of inference in any axiomatization of normal modal logic; it is generally called the necessitation
rule. These two properties turn out to be the most problematic features of normal modal logics when
they are used as logics of knowledge/belief (this point will be examined later).
Themost intriguingproperties ofnormal modal logicsfollow from thepropertiesof theaccessibility
relation, R, in models. To illustrate these properties, consider the following axiom schema.
ϕ ⇒ ϕ
It turns out that this axiom is characteristicof the class of models with a reﬂexive accessibilityrelation.
(By characteristic, we mean that it is true in all and only those models in the class.) There are a host of
axiomswhichcorrespondtocertain propertiesofR: the studyof theway thatpropertiesofR correspond
to axioms is called correspondence theory. For our present purposes, we identify just four axioms: the
axiom calledT, (whichcorrespondstoa reﬂexive accessibilityrelation);D (serial accessibilityrelation);
4 (transitive accessibility relation); and 5 (euclidean accessibility relation):
T ϕ ⇒ ϕ
D ϕ ⇒
￿ϕ
4 ϕ ⇒ ϕ
5
￿ϕ ⇒
￿ϕ.
The results of correspondence theory make it straightforwardto derive completeness results for a range
of simple normal modal logics. These results provide a useful point of comparison for normal modal
logics, and account in a large part for the popularityof this style of semantics. A system of logic can be
thought of as a set of formulae valid in some class of models; a member of the set is called a theorem
of the logic (if ϕ is a theorem, this is usually denoted by
  ϕ). The notation KΣ1 …Σn is often used
to denote the smallest normal modal logic containing axioms Σ1,…,Σn (recall that any normal modal
logic will contain the K axiom [58, p25]).
For the axioms T, D, 4, and 5, it would seem that there ought to be sixteen distinct systems of logic
(since 24 = 16). However, some of these systems turn out to be equivalent (in that they contain the
same theorems), and as a result there are only eleven distinct systems: K, K4, K5, KD, KT (= KDT),
K45, KD5, KD4, KT4 (=KDT4), KD45, and KT5 (= KT45, KDT5, KDT45); see [80, p99], and [26,
p132]. Because some modal systems are so widely used, they have been given names:
KT is known as T KT4 is known as S4
KD45 is known as weak-S5 KT5 is known as S5.*
Normal Modal Logics of Knowledge and Belief
To use the logic developed above as an epistemic logic, the formula ϕ is read as: ‘it is known
that ϕ’. The worlds in the model are interpreted as epistemic alternatives, the accessibility relation
deﬁnes what the alternatives are from any given world. The logic deals with the knowledge of a single
agent. Todeal withmulti-agentknowledge, oneadds toa model structurean indexedsetof accessibility
relations, one for each agent. A model is then a structure
hW, R1,…,R n,π
i where Ri is the knowledge
accessibility relation of agent i. The simple language deﬁned above is extended by replacing the single
modaloperator‘ ’byanindexedset ofunarymodal operators
fKi
g,w h e r ei ∈
f1,…,n
g. Theformula
Kiϕ is read: ‘i knows that ϕ’. The semantic rule for ‘ ’ is replaced by the following rule:
hM,w
i |= Kiϕ iff ∀w′∈W, if (w, w′) ∈ Ri then
hM,w′
i |= ϕ
Each operator Ki thus has exactly the same properties as ‘ ’. Corresponding to each of the modal
systems Σ, above, a corresponding system Σn is deﬁned, for the multi-agent logic. Thus Kn is the
smallest multi-agent epistemic logic and S5n is the largest.
The next step is to consider how well normal modal logic serves as a logic of knowledge/belief.
Consider ﬁrst the necessitationrule and axiom K, since any normal modal system is committedto these.
The necessitationrule tells us that an agent knowsall valid formulae. Amongst other things, this means
an agent knows all propositional tautologies. Since there are an inﬁnite number of these, an agent
will have an inﬁnite number of items of knowledge: immediately, one is faced with a counter-intuitive
property of the knowledge operator.
Now consider the axiom K, which says that an agent’s knowledge is closed under implication.
Suppose ϕ is a logical consequence of the set Φ =
fϕ1,…,ϕn
g,t h e ni ne v e r yw o r l dw h e r ea l lo fΦ are
true, ϕ must also be true, and hence the formula ϕ1 ∧⋅⋅⋅∧ϕn ⇒ ϕ must be valid. By necessitation,
this formula will also be believed. Since an agent’s beliefs are closed under implication, whenever
it believes each of Φ, it must also believe ϕ. Hence an agent’s knowledge is closed under logical
consequence. This also seems counter intuitive. For example, suppose, like every good logician, our
agent knows Peano’s axioms. Now Fermat’s last theorem follows from Peano’s axioms — but it took
thecombinedefforts ofsomeofthebestmindsoverthepastcenturytoproveit. Yet ifouragent’sbeliefs
are closed under logical consequence, then our agent must know it. So consequential closure, implied
by necessitation and the K axiom, seems an overstrong property for resource bounded reasoners.
Thesetwoproblems— thatofknowingallvalidformulae, andthatofknowledge/beliefbeingclosed
under logical consequence — together constitute the famous logical omniscience problem. It has been
widely argued that this problem makes the possible worlds model unsuitable for representing resource
bounded believers — and any real system is resource bounded.
Axioms for Knowledge and Belief
We now consider the appropriateness of the axioms Dn,T n,4 n,a n d5 n for logics of knowledge/belief.
The axiom Dn says that an agent’s beliefs are non-contradictory; it can be re-written in the following
form:
Kiϕ ⇒¬ Ki¬ϕ
which is read: ‘if i knows ϕ,t h e ni doesn’t know ¬ϕ’. This axiom seems a reasonable property of
knowledge/belief.
The axiom Tn is often called the knowledge axiom, since it says that what is known is true. It is
usually accepted as the axiom that distinguishes knowledge from belief: it seems reasonable that one
couldbelievesomethingthatisfalse, butone wouldhesitateto saythat onecouldknow somethingfalse.Knowledge is thus often deﬁned as true belief: i knows ϕ if i believes ϕ and ϕ is true. So deﬁned,
knowledge satisﬁes Tn.
Axiom 4n is called the positiveintrospectionaxiom. Introspectionis the process of examining one’s
own beliefs, and is discussed in detail in [80, Chapter 5]. The positiveintrospection axiom says that an
agent knows what it knows. Similarly, axiom 5n is the negative introspection axiom, which says that
an agent is aware of what it doesn’t know. Positive and negative introspection together imply an agent
has perfect knowledge about what it does and doesn’t know (cf. [80, Equation (5.11), p79]). Whether
or not the two types of introspection are appropriate properties for knowledge/belief is the subject of
some debate. However, it is generally accepted that positive introspectionis a less demanding property
than negative introspection, and is thus a more reasonable property for resource bounded reasoners.
Giventhecommentsabove,themodalsystemS5n isoftenchosenasalogicof(idealised)knowledge,
and weak-S5n is often chosen as a logic of (idealised) belief.
Alternatives to the Possible Worlds Model
As a result of the difﬁculties with logical omniscience, many researchers have attempted to develop
alternative formalisms for representing belief. Some of these are attempts to adapt the basic possible
worldsmodel; othersrepresentsigniﬁcantdeparturesfrom it. Inthesubsectionsthatfollow,we examine
some of these attempts.
Levesque — belief and awareness
In a 1984 paper, Levesque proposeda solutionto the logicalomniscience problem that involvesmaking
a distinctionbetween explicit and implicit belief [87]. Crudely, the idea is that an agent has a relatively
small set of explicit beliefs, and a very much larger (inﬁnite) set of implicit beliefs, which include the
logical consequences of the explicit beliefs. To formalise this idea, Levesque developed a logic with
two operators; one each for implicit and explicit belief. The semantics of the explicit belief operator
were given in terms of a weakened possible worlds semantics, by borrowing some ideas from situation
semantics [10, 37]. The semantics of the implicit belief operator were given in terms of a standard
possible worlds approach. A number of objections have been raised to Levesque’s model [109, p135]:
ﬁrst, it does not allow quantiﬁcation — this drawback has been rectiﬁed by Lakemeyer [85]; second, it
does not seem to allow for nested beliefs; third, the notion of a situation, which underlies Levesque’s
logic is, if anything, more mysterious than the notion of a world in possible worlds; and fourth, under
certain circumstances, Levesque’s proposal still makes unrealistic predictions about agent’s reasoning
capabilities.
In an effort to recover from this last negative result, Fagin and Halpern have developed a ‘logic of
general awareness’, based on a similar idea to Levesque’s but with a very much simpler semantics [40].
However, this proposal has itself been criticised by some [81].
Konolige — the deduction model
A more radical approach to modelling resource bounded believers was proposed by Konolige[80]. His
deduction model of belief is, in essence, a direct attempt to model the ‘beliefs’ of symbolic AI systems.
Konolige observed that a typical knowledge-based system has two key components: a database of
symbolically represented ‘beliefs’, (which may take the form of rules, frames, semantic nets, or, more
generally, formulae in some logical language), and some logically incomplete inference mechanism.
Konolige modelled such systems in terms of deduction structures. A deduction structure is a pair
d = (Δ,ρ),w h e r eΔ is a base set of formula in some logical language, and ρ is a set of inference rules,
(which may be logically incomplete), representing the agent’s reasoning mechanism. To simplify the
formalism, Konolige assumed that an agent would apply its inference rules wherever possible, in orderto generate the deductive closure of its base beliefs under its deduction rules. We model deductive
closure in a function close:
close((Δ,ρ))
def =
fϕ |Δ
 ρ ϕ
g
where Δ
 ρ ϕ means that ϕ can be proved from Δ using only the rules in ρ. A belief logic can then be
deﬁned, with the semantics to a modal belief connective [i],w h e r ei is an agent, given in terms of the
deduction structure di modelling i’s belief system:
[i]ϕ iff ϕ ∈ close(di).
Konolige went on to examine the properties of the deduction model at some length, and developed a
variety of proof methods for his logics, including resolution and tableau systems [49]. The deduction
model is undoubtedlysimple; some might even argue that it is naive. However, as a direct model of the
belief systems of AI agents, it has much to commend it.
Meta-languages and syntactic modalities
A meta-language is one in which it is possible to represent the properties of another language. A
ﬁrst-order meta-language is a ﬁrst-order logic, with the standard predicates, quantiﬁers, terms, and
so on, whose domain contains formulae of some other language, called the object language. Using
a meta-language, it is possible to represent a relationship between a meta-language term denoting an
agent, and an object language term denoting some formula. For example, the meta-language formula
Bel(Janine,
dFather(Zeus,Cronos)
e) might be used to represent the example (1) the we saw earlier.
The quote marks,
d …
e, are used to indicate that their contents are a meta-language term denoting the
corresponding object-language formula.
Unfortunately, meta-language formalisms have their own package of problems, not the least of
which is that they tend to fall prey to inconsistency [95, 132]. However, there have been some fairly
successful meta-language formalisms, including those by Konolige [79], Haas [61], Morgenstern [97],
and Davies [32]. Some results on retrieving consistency appeared in the late 1980s [101, 102, 36, 133].
2.3 Towards a Theory of Agency
All of the formalisms considered so far have focussed on just one aspect of intelligent agency: either
knowledge or belief. However, it is to be expected that any realistic agent theory will be represented in
a much richer logical framework. First, neither agents nor the world they inhabit are static. In addition
to the information and pro-attitudes we mentioned earlier, an agent logic must therefore be capable
of representing the time-varying aspects of agents and their world. Moreover, although we suggested
earlier that action was a somewhat slippery concept, we shall ultimately expect our agents to do things;
some representation of action is therefore desirable.
A complete agent theory, expressed in a logic withthese properties, must show how these attributes
are related. For example, itwillneedtoexplainhowan agent’sinformationandpro-attitudesare related;
howanagent’scognitivestatechangesovertime;howtheenvironmentaffects anagent’scognitivestate;
and how an agent’s information and pro-attitudes lead it to perform actions. Giving a good account of
these relationships is perhaps the most signiﬁcant problem faced by agent theorists.
Such an all-embracing agent theory is some time off, and yet signiﬁcant steps have been taken
towards it. In the following subsections, we brieﬂy review some of this work.
Moore — knowledge and action
Moore was in many ways a pioneer of the use of logics for capturing aspects of agency [96]. His main
concern wasthe studyof knowledgepre-conditionsforactions— thequestionof whatan agentneeds toknow in order to be able to perform some action. He formalised a model of abilityin a logic containing
a modality for knowledge, and a dynamic logic-like apparatus for modelling action (cf. [67]). This
formalism allowed for the possibility of an agent having incomplete information about how to achieve
some goal, and performing actions in order to ﬁnd out how to achieve it. Critiques of the formalism
(and attempts to improve on it) may be found in [97, 86].
Cohen & Levesque — intention
Probably the best-known and most inﬂuential contribution to the area of agent theory is due to Cohen
and Levesque [28]. Their formalism was originallyused to develop a theory of intention(as in ‘I intend
to…’), which the authors required as a pre-requisitefor a theory of speech acts [29]. However, the logic
has subsequently proved to be so useful for reasoning about agents that it has been used in an analysis
of conﬂict and cooperation in multi-agent dialogue [48, 47], as well as several studies in the theoretical
foundationsof cooperativeproblemsolving[88, 73, 21, 22]. Here, we shallreview itsuse indeveloping
a theory of intention.
When building intelligent agents — particularly agents that must interact with humans — it is
important that a rational balance is achieved between the beliefs and goals of the agents:
‘For example, the following are desirable properties of intention: An autonomous agent
should act on its intentions, not in spite of them; adopt intentions it believes are feasible
and forgo those believed to be infeasible; keep (or commit to) intentions, but not forever;
discharge those intentions believed to have been satisﬁed; alter intentions when relevant
beliefs change; and adopt subsidiary intentions during plan formation’. [28, p214]
Following Bratman, [14, 15], Cohen and Levesque identify seven properties that must be satisﬁed by a
reasonable theory of intention:
1. Intentions pose problems for agents, who need to determine ways of achieving them.
2. Intentions provide a ‘ﬁlter’ for adopting other intentions, which must not conﬂict.
3. Agents track the success of their intentions, and are inclined to try again if their attempts fail.
4. Agents believe their intentions are possible.
5. Agents do not believe they will not bring about their intentions.
6. Under certain circumstances, agents believe they will bring about their intentions.
7. Agents need not intend all the expected side effects of their intentions.
Given these criteria, Cohen and Levesque adopt a two-tiered approach to the problem of formalizing
a theory of intention. First, they construct a logic of rational agency, ‘being careful to sort out the
relationships among the basic modal operators’ [28, p221]. On top of this framework, they introduce a
number of derived constructs, which constitutea ‘partial theory of rational action’ [28, p221]; intention
is one of these constructs. Syntactically, the logic is a many-sorted, quantiﬁed, multi-modal logic with
equality, containing four primary modalities:
(BEL x ϕ) Agent x believes ϕ (GOAL x ϕ) Agent x has goal of ϕ
(HAPPENS α) Action α will happen next (DONE α) Action α has just happenedThe semantics of BEL and GOAL are given via possibleworlds, in the usual way: each agent is assigned
a belief accessibility relation, and a goal accessibility relation. The belief accessibility relation is euc-
lidean, transitive,and serial, givinga belief logic of KD45. The goal relation is serial, givinga conative
logic KD. It is assumed that each agent’s goal relation is a subset of its belief relation, implying that
an agent will not have a goal of something it believes will not happen. Worlds in the formalism are a
discrete sequence of events, stretching inﬁnitely into past and future.
The two basic temporal operators, HAPPENS and DONE, are augmented by some operators for
describing the structure of event sequences, in the style of dynamic logic [67]. The two most important
of these constructors are ‘;’ and ‘?’:
α;α′ denotes α followed by α′
α? denotes a ‘test action’ α
The standard future time operators of temporal logic, ‘ ’ (always), and ‘
￿’ (sometime) can be deﬁned
as abbreviations, along with a ‘strict’ sometime operator, LATER:
￿α
def = ∃x ⋅( HAPPENS x;α?) α
def = ¬
￿¬α (LATER p)
def = ¬p ∧
￿p
A temporal precedence operator, (BEFORE pq ) can also be derived, and holds if p holds before q.A n
important assumption is that all goals are eventually dropped:
￿¬(GOAL x (LATER p)).
The ﬁrst major derived construct is a persistent goal.
(P-GOAL xp )
def = (GOAL x (LATER p)) ∧ (BEL x ¬p)∧
￿
￿
￿
BEFORE
((BEL xp )∨( BEL x ¬p))
¬(GOAL x (LATER p))
￿
￿
￿
So, an agent has a persistent goal of p if:
1. It has a goal that p eventually becomes true, and believes that p is not currently true.
2. Before itdrops the goal, one of the followingconditionsmust hold: (i) the agentbelieves the goal
has been satisﬁed; or (ii) the agent believes the goal will never be satisﬁed.
It is a small step from persistentgoals to a ﬁrst deﬁnition of intention,as in ‘intendingto act’. Note that
‘intending that something becomes true’ is similar, but requires a slightly different deﬁnition; see [28].
(INTEND x α)
def = (P-GOAL x [DONE x (BEL x (HAPPENS α))?;α])
Cohen and Levesquego on to showhow such a deﬁnitionmeets many of Bratman’s criteria for a theory
of intention (outlined above). A critique of Cohen and Levesque’s theory of intention may be found
in [126]; space restrictions prevent a discussion here.
Rao & Georgeff — belief, desire, intention architectures
As we observed earlier, there is no clear consensus in either the AI or philosophy communities about
precisely which combination of information and pro-attitudes are best suited to characterising rational
agents. In the work of Cohen and Levesque, describedabove, justtwobasic attitudeswere used: beliefs
and goals. Further attitudes, such as intention, were deﬁned in terms of these. In related work, Rao
and Georgeff have developed a logical framework for agent theory based on three primitive modalities:
beliefs, desires, and intentions [105, 104, 107]. Their formalism is based on a branching model of
time, (cf. [39]), in which belief-, desire- and intention-accessibleworlds are themselves branching time
structures. They are particularly concerned with the notionof realism — the questionof how an agent’s
beliefs about the future affect its desires and intentions. In other work, they also consider the potential
for adding (social) plans to their formalism [106, 77].Singh
A quite different approach to modelling agents was taken by Singh, who has developed an interesting
family of logics for representing intentions, beliefs, knowledge, know-how, and communication in a
branching-timeframework [123, 124, 127, 125]. The model of intentionsand beliefs isbased on Asher-
Kamp Discourse Representation Theory. Singh’s formalism is extremely rich, and considerable effort
has been devoted to establishing its properties. However, its complexity prevents a detailed discussion
here.
Werner
In an extensive sequence of papers, Werner has laid the foundations of a general model of agency,
which draws upon work in economics, game theory, situated automata theory, situation semantics, and
philosophy[136, 137, 138, 139]. At the time of writing, however, the properties of this model have not
been investigated in depth.
Wooldridge — modelling multi-agent systems
For his 1992 doctoral thesis, Wooldridge developed a family of logics for representing the properties
of multi-agent systems [143, 145]. Unlike the approaches cited above, Wooldridge’s aim was not to
develop a general framework for agent theory. Rather, he hoped to construct formalisms that might be
used in the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of realistic multi-agent systems. To this end, he developed a
simple, and in some sense general, model of multi-agent systems, and showed how the histories traced
out in the execution of such a system could be used as the semantic foundation for a family of both
linear and branching time temporal belief logics. He then gave examples of how these logics could be
used in the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of moderately realistic protocols for cooperative action.
2.4 Further Reading
For a detailed discussion of intentionality and the intentional stance, see [34, 35]. A number of papers
on AI treatments of agency may be found in [5]. For an introductionto modal logic, see [26]; a slightly
older, though more wide ranging introduction, may be found in [72]. As for the use of modal logics
to model belief, see [65], which includes complexity results and proof procedures. Related work on
modelling knowledge has been done by the distributed systems community, who give the worlds in
possible worlds semantics a precise interpretation; for an introduction and further references, see [64,
41]. Overviews of formalisms for modelling belief and knowledge may be found in [63, 80, 108, 143].
A variantonthepossibleworldsframework, called therecursivemodellingmethod,is describedin [57];
a deep theory of belief may be found in [89]. Situation semantics, developed in the early 1980s and
recently thesubject of renewed interest, represent a fundamentally newapproach to modellingtheworld
and cognitive systems [10, 37]. However, situationsemantics are not (yet) in the mainstream of (D)AI,
and it is not obvious what impact the paradigm will ultimately have.
Logics which integrate time with mental states are discussed in [83, 66, 146]; the last of these
presents a tableau-based proof method for a temporal belief logic. Two other important references for
temporal aspects are [119, 120]. Thomas has developed some logics for representing agent theories
as part of her framework for agent programming languages; see [131, 130] and section 4. For an
introductionto thetemporal logicsandrelated topics, see [58, 38]. A non-formal discussionof intention
may be found in [14], or more brieﬂy [15]. Further work on modelling intention may be found in [60,
114, 59, 82]. Related work, focussing less on single-agent attitudes, and more on social aspects, is [74,
144, 147].3 Agent Architectures
Until now, this article has been concerned with agent theory — the constructionof formalisms for reas-
oning about agents, and the properties of agents expressed in such formalisms. Our aim in this section
is to shift the emphasis from theory to practice. We consider the issues surrounding the construction of
computer systems that satisfy the properties speciﬁed by agent theorists. We begin by looking at the
symbolic AI paradigm, and the assumptions that underpin it.
3.1 Classical Approaches: Deliberative Architectures
The foundation upon which the symbolic AI paradigm rests is the physical-symbol system hypothesis,
formulatedbyNewellandSimon[99]7. Aphysicalsymbolsystemisdeﬁnedtobeaphysicallyrealizable
set of physical entities (symbols) that can be combined to form structures, and which is capable of
running processes which operate on thosesymbols according to symbolicallycoded sets of instructions.
The physical-symbol system hypothesis then says that such a system is capable of general intelligent
action.
ItisashortstepfromthenotionofaphysicalsymbolsystemtoMcCarthy’sdreamofasententialpro-
cessing automaton,ordeliberate agent (the term ‘deliberate agent’ was introduced by Genesereth, [50,
pp325–327],butis here used in a slightlymore general sense). A deliberate agent is one whichcontains
an explicitlyrepresented, symbolic model of the world, and in whichdecisions(for example about what
actions to perform) are made via logical (or at least pseudo-logical) reasoning:
‘Supporters of classical AI have, in general, accepted the physical symbol system hypo-
thesis … [C]omplacent acceptance of this hypothesis,or some variant of it, led researchers
to believe that the appropriate way to design an agent capable of ﬁnding its way round and
acting in the physical world would be to equip it with some formal, logic-based represent-
ation of that world and get it to do a bit of theorem proving’. [118, §3.2]
If one aims to build such an agent, then there are at least two important problems to be solved:
1. The transduction problem: that of translating the real world into an accurate, adequate symbolic
description, in time for that description to be useful.
2. The representation/reasoning problem: that of how to symbolically represent information about
complex real-world entities and processes, and how to get agents to reason with this information
in time for the results to be useful.
The former problem has led to work on vision, speech understanding, learning, etc. The latter has
led to work on knowledge representation, automated reasoning, automated planning, etc. Despite the
immense volume of work that the problems have generated, most researchers would accept that neither
problem is anywhere near solved. Even seemingly trivial problems, such as commonsense reasoning,
have turned out to be extremely difﬁcult. It is because of these problems that some researchers have
looked to alternative techniques; such alternatives are discussed in section 3.2. First, however, we
consider efforts made within the symbolic AI community to construct agents.
Planning agents
Since the early 1970s, the AI planning community has been closely concerned with the design of artiﬁ-
cial agents; in fact, it seems reasonable to claim that most innovations in agent design have come from
this community. Planning is essentially automatic programming: the design of a detailed course of ac-
tionwhich, when executed, willresultin the achievement of some desired goal. Withinthe symbolicAI
7See [118] for a detailed discussionof the way that this hypothesis has affected thinking in symbolic AI.community, ithas longbeenassumed thatsome form of AI planningsystem willbe a central component
of any artiﬁcial agent. Perhaps the best know early planning system was STRIPS [44]. This system
takes a symbolic descripion of both the world and a desired goal state, and a set of action descriptions,
which characterise the pre- and post-conditionsassociated with various actions. It then attempts to ﬁnd
a sequence of actions that will achieve the goal, by using a simple means-ends analysis, which essen-
tially involves matching the post-conditions of actions against the desired goal. The STRIPS planning
algorithm was very simple, and proved to be ineffective on problems of even moderate complexity.
Much effort was subsequently devoted to developing more effective automatic planning techniques.
Two major innovations were hierarchical and non-linear planning [113, 112]. However, in the mid
1980s, Chapman established some theoretical results which indicate that even such reﬁned techniques
will ultimately turn out to be unusable in any time-constrained system [24]. These results have had a
profound inﬂuence on subsequentAI planningresearch; perhaps more than any other results, they have
caused some researchers to question the whole symbolic AI paradigm, and have thus led to the work
on alternative approaches that we discuss in section 3.2.
In spite of these difﬁculties, various attempts have been made to construct agents whose primary
component is a planner. For example: the Integrated Planning, Execution and Monitoring (IPEM)
system is based on a sophisticated non-linear planner [7]; Wood’s AUTODRIVE system has planning
agents operating in a highly dynamic environment (a trafﬁc simulation) [142].
Bratman, Israel & Pollack — IRMA
Insection2,wesawthatsomeresearchershaveconsideredframeworks foragenttheorybasedonbeliefs,
desires, and intentions[105]. Some researchers have also developed agent architectures based on these
attitudes. One example is the Intelligent Resource-bounded Machine Architecture (IRMA) [16]. This
architecture has four key symbolicdata structures: a plan library, and explicitrepresentationsof beliefs,
desires, and intentions. Additionally, the architecture has: a reasoner, for reasoning about the world;
a means-ends analyser, for determining which plans might be used to achieve the agent’s intentions;
an opportunity analyser, which monitors the environment in order to determine further options for the
agent; a ﬁlteringprocess;a n dadeliberationprocess.T h eﬁlteringprocessisresponsiblefordetermining
the subset of the agent’s potential courses of action that have the property of being consistent with the
agent’s current intentions. A ﬁnal choice between options is made by the deliberation process. The
IRMA architecture has been evaluated in an experimental scenario known as the Tileworld [103].
Vere & Bickmore — Homer
AninterestingexperimentinthedesignofintelligentagentswasconductedbyVereandBickmore[134].
They argued that the enabling technologies for intelligent agents are sufﬁciently developed to be able
to construct a prototype autonomous agent, with linguistic ability, planning and acting capabilities,
and so on. They developed such an agent, and christened it Homer. This agent is a simulated robot
submarine, which exists in a two-dimensional ‘Seaworld’, about which it has only partial knowledge.
Homer takes instructionsfrom a user in a limited subset of Englishwith about an 800 word vocabulary;
instructionscan contain moderately sophisticatedtemporal references. Homer can plan how to achieve
its instructions, (which typically relate to collecting and moving items around the Seaworld), and can
then execute its plans, modifying them as required during execution. The agent has a limited episodic
memory, and using this, is able to answer questions about its past experiences.
3.2 Alternative Approaches: Reactive Architectures
As we observed above, there are many unsolved(some wouldsay intractable) problems associatedwith
symbolicAI.Theseproblemshaveleadsomeresearcherstoquestiontheviabilityofthewholeparadigm,
and to the developmentof what are generally knowas reactive architectures. For our purposes, we shalldeﬁne a reactive architecture to be one which does not include any kind of central symbolic world
model, and does not use complex symbolic reasoning.
Brooks — behaviour languages
Probably the most vocal critic of the symbolic AI notion of agency has been Rodney Brooks, a re-
searcher at MIT who apparently became frustrated by AI approaches to building control mechanisms
for autonomous mobile robots. In a 1985 paper, he outlined an alternative architecture for building
agents, the so called subsumptionarchitecture [17]. The analysis of alternative approaches begins with
Brooks’ work.
In recent papers, [20, 19, 18], Brooks has propounded three key theses:
1. Intelligent behaviour can be generated without explicit representations of the kind that symbolic
AI proposes.
2. Intelligentbehaviourcanbegeneratedwithoutexplicitabstractreasoningofthekindthatsymbolic
AI proposes.
3. Intelligence is an emergent property of certain complex systems.
Brooks identiﬁes two key ideas that have informed his research:
1. Situatedness and embodiment: ‘Real’ intelligence is situated in the world, not in disembodied
systems such as theorem provers or expert systems.
2. Intelligence and emergence: ‘Intelligent’ behaviour arises as a result of an agent’s interaction
withits environment. Also, intelligenceis ‘in the eye of the beholder’; it is notan innate, isolated
property.
If Brooks was just a Dreyfus-style critic of AI, his ideas might not have gained much currency.
However, to demonstrate the validity of his claims, he has built a number of robots, based on the sub-
sumption architecture. A subsumption architecture is a hierarchy of task-accomplishing behaviours.
Each behaviour ‘competes’ with the others to exercise control over the robot. Lower layers represent
more primitive kinds of behaviour, (such as avoiding obstacles), and have precedence over layers fur-
ther up the hierarchy. It should be stressed that the resulting systems are, in terms of the amount of
computation they need to do, extremely simple, with no explicit reasoning, or even pattern matching,
of the kind found in symbolic AI systems. But despite this simplicity, Brooks has demonstrated the ro-
bots doing tasks that would be impressive if they were accomplished by symbolic AI systems. Similar
work has been reported by Steels, who described simulations of ‘Mars explorer’ systems, containing a
large number of subsumption-architecture agents, that can achieve near-optimal performance in certain
tasks [129].
Agre & Chapman — Pengi
At about the same time as Brooks was describing his ﬁrst results with the subsumption architecture,
Chapman was completing his Master’s thesis, in which he reported the theoretical difﬁculties with
planningdescribedabove,andwascomingtosimilarconclusionsabouttheinadequaciesofthesymbolic
AImodelhimself. Togetherwithhisco-workerAgre, hebegantoexplorealternativestotheAIplanning
paradigm [25].
Agre observed that most everyday activity is ‘routine’ in the sense that it requires little — if any
— new abstract reasoning. Most tasks, once learned, can be accomplished in a routine way, with little
variation. Agre proposed that an efﬁcient agent architecture could be based on the idea of ‘runningarguments’. Crudely, the idea is that as most decisions are ‘routine’, they can be encoded into a low-
level structure (such as a digital circuit), which only needs periodic updating, perhaps to handle new
kinds of problems. His approach was illustrated with the celebrated Pengi system [3]. Pengi is a
simulated video game, with the central character controlledusing a scheme such as that outlinedabove.
Rosenschein & Kaelbling — situated automata
Another sophisticated approach is that of Rosenschein and Kaelbling [110, 111, 76]. In their situ-
ated automata paradigm, an agent is speciﬁed in terms of a logic of knowledge. This speciﬁcation is
then compiled down to a low-level digital machine, which satisﬁes the intentional speciﬁcation. The
technique depends upon the possibility of giving the worlds in possible worlds semantics a concrete
interpretation in terms of the states of an automaton:
‘[An agent] … x is said to carry the information that p in world state s, written s |= K(x,p),
if for all world states in which x has the same value as it does in s, the proposition p is
true.’ [76, p36]
The authors have developed several software tools to assist in the construction of agents: the Ruler
program is used to specify the perception component of an agent; the Gapps program is used to specify
the action component. Both of these languages are implemented over a third, LISP-like language, called
Rex, which is used to specify simple digital machines. The situated automata paradigm has attracted
much interest. However, at the time of writing, the theoretical limitations of the approach are not well
understood.
Connah & Wavish — ABLE
Agroupofresearchers at Philipsresearch labsintheUKhave developedanAgent BehaviourLanguage,
(ABLE), in which agents are programmed in terms of simple, rule-likelicences [31, 135]. Licences may
include some representation of time (though the language is not based on any kind of temporal logic):
they loosely resemble behaviours in the subsumption architecture (see above). ABLE can be compiled
down to a simple digital machine, realised in the ‘C’ programming language. The idea is similar to
situated automata, though there appears to be no equivalent theoretical foundation. The result of the
compilationprocessisaveryfastimplementation,whichhasbeenreportedlyusedtocontrolanCompact
Disk-Interactive (CD-I) application.
3.3 Hybrid Architectures
Many researchers have suggested that neither a completely deliberative nor completely reactive ap-
proach is suitable for building agents. They have argued the case for hybrid systems, which attempt to
marry classical and alternative approaches. In this section, we review these approaches.
Georgeff & Lansky — PRS
One of the best known agent architectures is the Procedural Reasoning System (PRS), developed by
Georgeff and Lansky [54]. Like IRMA, (see above), the PRS is a belief-desire-intention architecture,
which includes a plan library, as well as explicit symbolic representations of beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions. Beliefsare facts, eitherabouttheexternalworldorthesystem’sinternalstate,andare expressedin
classical ﬁrst-order logic. Desires are represented as system behaviours (rather than as static represent-
ations of goal states). A PRS plan library contains a set of partially-elaborated plans, called knowledge
areas (KAs), each of which is associated with an invocationcondition. This conditiondetermines when
the KA is to be activated. KAs may be activated in a goal-driven or data driven fashion; KAs may also
be reactive, allowing the PRS to respond rapidly to changes in its environment. The set of currentlyactive KAs in a system represent its intentions. These various data structures are manipulated by a
system interpreter, which is responsiblefor updatingbeliefs, invokingKAs, and executing actions. The
PRS has been evaluatedina simulationof maintenance proceduresfor the space shuttle,as well as other
domains [52].
Ferguson — TouringMachines
For his 1992 Doctoral thesis, Ferguson developed the TouringMachines hybrid agent architecture [43,
42]8. The architecture consists of perception and action subsystems, which interface directly with
the agent’s environment, and three control layers,e m b e d d e di nacontrol framework, which mediates
between the layers. Each layer is an independent, activity-producing, concurrently executing process.
Thereactivelayergeneratespotentialcoursesofactioninresponsetoeventsthathappentooquickly
fortheotherlayerstodealwith. Itisimplementedasasetofsituation-actionrules,inthestyleofBrooks’
subsumption architecture (see above).
The planning layer constructs plans and selects actions to execute in order to achieve the agent’s
goals. This layer consists of two components: a planner, and a focus of attention mechanism.T h e
plannerintegratesplangenerationandexecution,andusesalibraryofpartiallyelaboratedplans,together
with a topological world map, in order to construct plans that will accomplish the agent’s main goal.
The purpose of the focus of attention mechanism is to limit the amount of information that the planner
must deal with, and so improve its efﬁciency. It does this by ﬁltering out irrelevant information from
the environment.
The modelling layer contains symbolic representations of the cognitive state of other entities in the
agent’s environment. These models are manipulated in order to identify and resolve goal conﬂicts —
situations where an agent can no longer achieve its goals, as a result of unexpected interference.
Thethreelayersareabletocommunicatewitheach other(viamessagepassing),andareembedded in
a control framework. The purpose of thisframework is to mediate between the layers, and in particular,
to deal with conﬂicting action proposals from the different layers. The control framework does this by
using control rules.
3.4 Further Reading
Most introductory textbooks on AI discuss the physical symbol system hypothesis; a good recent ex-
ample of such a text is [56]. There are many objections to the symbolic AI paradigm, in addition to
those we have outlined above. Again, introductory textbooks provide the stock criticisms and replies.
There is a wealth of material on planning and planningagents. See [51] for an overview of the state
oftheartinplanning(asitwasin1987), [5]forathoroughcollectionofpapersonplanning,(manyofthe
papers cited above are included), and [140] for a detailed description of SIPE, a sophisticated planning
system used in a real-world application (the control of a brewery!) Another important collection of
planning papers is [53]. The books by Dean & Wellman and Allen et al. contain much useful related
material [33, 6]. There is now a regular international conference on planning; the proceedings of the
ﬁrst were published as [68].
The collectionof papers edited by Maes [90] containsmany interestingpapers on alternativesto the
symbolic AI paradigm. Kaelbling [75] presents a clear discussion of the issues associated with devel-
oping resource-bounded rational agents, and proposes an agent architecture somewhat similar to that
developedby Brooks. A proposalbyNilssonfor teleoreactive programs— goaldirected programs that
nevertheless respond to their environment — is described in [100]. The proposal draws heavily on the
situatedautomata paradigm; otherwork basedon thisparadigm isdescribedin [121, 78]. Schoppershas
8It is worth noting that Ferguson’s thesis gives an excellent overview of the problems and issues associated with building
rational, resource-bounded agents. Moreover, the description given of the TouringMachines architecture is itself extremely
clear. We recommend it as a point of departure for further reading.proposed compilingplans in advance, using traditionalplanningtechniques, in order to develop univer-
sal plans, which are essentially decision trees that can be used to efﬁciently determine an appropriate
action in any situation [115]. Other proposals for ‘reactive planners’ are reactive action packages [45]
and competence modules [91].
A hybrid architecture speciﬁcally developed for multi-agent applications is described in [62].
4 Agent Languages
By an agent language, we mean a system that allows one to program hardware or software computer
systems in terms of some of the concepts developed by agent theorists. At the very least, we expect
such a language include some structure corresponding to an agent. However, we would also expect to
see some other attributesof agency (beliefs, goals, or other mentalisticnotions)used to program agents.
As the reader can see, the distinctionbetween an agent language and architecture is somewhat artiﬁcial;
many of the architectures mentioned above could be counted as languages by this deﬁnition.
Much of the current interest in agent languages is a result of Shoham’s proposal for agent-oriented
programming. We begin our consideration of languages with a survey of Shoham’s work.
Shoham — agent-oriented programming
Yoav Shoham has proposed a ‘new programming paradigm, based on a societal view of computa-
tion’ [121, p4],[122]. The key idea which informs this agent-orientedprogramming(AOP) paradigm is
that of directly programming agents in terms of the mentalistic, intentional notions that agent theorists
have developed to represent the properties of agents. The motivation behind such a proposal is that, as
we observed in section 2, humans use the intentionalstance as an abstractionmechanism for represent-
ing the properties of complex systems. In the same way that we use the intentional stance to describe
humans, it might be useful to use the intentional stance to program machines.
Shoham proposes that a fully developed AOP system will have three components:
• a logical system for deﬁning the mental state of agents;
• an interpreted programming language for programming agents;
• an ‘agentiﬁcation’ process, for compiling agent programs into low-level executable systems.
Atthe timeof writing,Shoham has onlypublishedresultsontheﬁrst twocomponents. (In [121, p12]he
wrotethat‘thethirdisstillsomewhatmysterioustome’, thoughlaterinthepaperheindicatedthathewas
thinkingof something along the lines of Rosenschein & Kaelbling’s situatedautomata paradigm [111].)
Shoham’s ﬁrst attempt at an AOP language was the AGENT0 system. The logical component of this
system is a quantiﬁed multi-modal logic, allowingdirect reference to time. No semantics are given, but
the logic appears to be based on [131]. The logic contains three modalities: belief, commitment and
ability. The following is an acceptable formula of the logic, illustratingit’s key properties:
CAN
5
a open(door)
8 ⇒ B
5
b CAN
5
a open(door)
8.
This formula is read: ‘if at time 5 agent a can ensure that the door is open at time 8, then at time 5 agent
b believes that at time 5 agent a can ensure that the door is open at time 8’.
Corresponding to the logic is the AGENT0 programming language. In this language, an agent is
speciﬁed in terms of a set of capabilities (things the agent can do), a set of initial beliefs and commit-
ments, and a set of commitment rules. The key component, which determines how the agent acts, is the
commitment rule set. Each commitment rule contains a message condition,amental condition,a n da n
action. In order to determine whether such a rule ﬁres, the message condition is matched against themessages the agent has received; the mental conditionis matched against the beliefs of the agent. If the
rule ﬁres, then the agent becomes committed to the action. Actionsmay be private, correspondingto an
internally executed subroutine, or communicative, i.e., sending messages. Messages are constrained to
be one of three types: ‘requests’ or ‘unrequests’ to perform or refrain from actions, and ‘inform’ mes-
sages, which pass on information — Shoham indicates that he took his inspiration for these message
types from speech act theory [116, 30]. Request and unrequest messages typically result in the agent’s
commitments being modiﬁed; inform messages result in a change to the agent’s beliefs.
AGENT0 was only ever intended as a prototype, to illustrate the principlesof AOP. A more reﬁned
implementation was developed by Thomas, for her 1993 doctoral thesis [130]. Her Planning Commu-
nicating Agents (PLACA) language was intended to address one severe drawback to AGENT0: the
inabilityof agents to plan, and communicate requestsfor action via high-levelgoals. Agentsin PLACA
are programmed in much the same way as in AGENT0, in terms of mental change rules. The logical
component of PLACA is similar to AGENT0’s, but includes operators for planning to do actions and
achieve goals. The semantics of the logic and its properties are examined in detail. However, PLACA
is not at the ‘production’ stage; it is an experimental language.
Fisher — Concurrent METATEM
Onedrawback withbothAGENT0andPLACAisthattherelationshipbetweenthelogicandinterpreted
programming language is only loosely deﬁned: in neither case can the programming language be said
to truly execute the associated logic. The Concurrent METATEM language developed by Fisher can
make a stronger claim in this respect [46]. A Concurrent METATEM system contains a number of
concurrently executing agents, each of which is able to communicate with its peers via asynchronous
broadcast message passing. Each agent is programmed by giving it a temporal logic speciﬁcation of
the behaviour that it is intended the agent should exhibit. An agent’s speciﬁcation is executed directly
to generate its behaviour. Execution of the agent program corresponds to iteratively building a logical
model for the temporal agent speciﬁcation. It is possible to prove that the procedure used to execute an
agent speciﬁcation is correct, in that if it is possible to satisfy the speciﬁcation, then the agent will do
so [9].
ThelogicalsemanticsofConcurrentMETATEM are closelyrelated to thesemanticsof temporal logic
itself. Thismeans that, amongstother things,the speciﬁcationand veriﬁcationof Concurrent METATEM
system is a viable proposition. At the time of writing, only prototype implementations of the language
are available; full implementations are expected soon.
4.1 Further Reading
There are many other languages which, while they may not be agent languages in the sense we have
described, are nevertheless of interest. Concurrent object languages are of considerable interest in
software engineering. The notion of a self-contained concurrently executing object, with some internal
statethat is not directly accessibleto theoutsideworld,responding to messages from othersuch objects,
is very close to the concept of an agent as we have deﬁned it. The only signiﬁcant difference is that
our agents are deﬁned in terms of beliefs, goals, and so on. The earliest concurrent object framework
was Hewitt’s Actor model [70, 1]; another well-known example is the ABCL system [148]. A recent
collection of papers on concurrent object systems is [2].
OtherlanguagesofinterestincludeOz[69]andIC PROLOGII [27]. Thelatter,asitsname suggests,
isanextensionofPROLOG,whichincludesmultiple-threads,high-levelcommunicationprimitives,and
some object-oriented features.5 Concluding Remarks
In thispaper, we hope to have at least mentionedthe major research issuesand developmentsassociated
with the synthesis of artiﬁcial agents from the point of view of AI. In this ﬁnal section, we point the
reader at some current applications of agent technology in AI and computer science generally.
Distributed AI
As we observed in section 1, there has been a marked ﬂowering of interest in agent technology since
the mid-1980s. This interest is in part due to the renewed interest in Distributed AI. Although DAI
encompasses most of the issues we have discussed in this paper, it should be stressed that the classical
emphasis in DAI has been on macro phenomona (the social level), rather than the micro phenomena
(the agent level) that we have been concerned within thispaper. DAI thus looksat such issuesas how a
groupofagentscan bemade tocooperateinorder toefﬁcientlysolveproblems, andhowtheactivitiesof
such a group can be efﬁciently coordinated. DAI researchers have applied agent technologyin a variety
of areas. Example applications include power systems management [141], air trafﬁc control [128], and
intelligent document retrieval [98]. The classic reference to DAI is [13].
Agents in CSCW
The possible applications of agent technology in computer supported cooperative work (CSCW) are
currentlythe subjectof much interest. CSCW isinformally deﬁned by Baecker to be ‘computer assisted
coordinatedactivitysuchas problemsolvingandcommunicationcarried outbya groupof collaborating
individuals’[8, p1]. The primary emphasis of CSCW is on the development of (hardware and) software
tools to support collaborative human work — the term groupware has been coined to describe such
tools. Various authors have proposed the use of agent technology in groupware. For example, in his
participantsystems proposal, Chang suggestssystems in which humans collaborate with not only other
humans, but also with artiﬁcial agents [23]. McGregor has imagined prescient agents — intelligent
administrative assistants, that predict our actions, and carry out routine or repetetive administrative
procedures on our behalf [94]. For example, imagine a group of computer agents that scanned email
and prioritisedit, junkingirrelevant orduplicatedmail items9; or imaginea groupof agentsthat scanned
USENET news for you, bringing to your attentionconference announcements of interest, perhaps even
using FTP or World Wide Web to cooperate with other agents and obtain papers that look relevant;
imagine how useful (or perhaps annoying) it would be to have an agent remind you of a conference
deadline in time to ﬁnish off a half-written paper. While these applications are (mostly) some time off,
their basic principles are, at the time of writing, the subject of serious academic and industrial research.
We refer the interested reader to the collection of papers edited by Baecker for more details [8].
Agents in Virtual Environments
The potential for marrying agent technology with virtual environments is being investigated in the Oz
project10 [11]. The aim of the project is to develop ‘… artistically interesting, highly interactive, simu-
lated worlds… to give users the experience of living in (not merely watching) dramatically rich worlds
that include moderately competent, emotional agents’ [12, p1]. A pre-requisite is the development
of broad agents — systems that include ‘a broad set of capabilities, including goal-directed reactive
behaviour, emotional state and behaviour, and some natural language abilities’ [12, p1].
9Such a system has been prototyped [92].
10Not to be confused with the OZ programming language [69].Towards Agent-Based Open Systems
While the reviews presented above are by no means exhaustive, they at least indicate that computer
scientists and AI researchers with a range of interests, applications, and backgrounds are taking agent
technologyseriously. As computer systemsbecome ever more openand interconnected, we may expect
that this technology will become increasingly common.
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publication we know of is the the International Journal on Intelligent and Cooperative Information
Systems (IJICIS).
The reader may be interested to note that a BIBTEX format database containing more than ﬁve-
hundred related references (including all those that appear in this paper) is available on request from
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